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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
of rent abatement to reflect this state of disrepair of leased premises."m
Even so, the tenant is still forced to live under these substandard con-
ditions. As a matter of public policy, the tenant needs some weapon
by which he may compel the landlord to make the needed repairs.
Here emerge the remedies of rent withholding" and suits for overpay-
ment of rent.' 2  This is the minimum economic leverage which the
tenant must have to approach a bargaining position equal to that of
the landlord. One policy rationale behind such a position may be found
in the opinion of the court in Pines v. Perssion, where it was stated
that, "Permitting landlords to rent 'tumbledown' houses is at least a
contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delin-
quency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners."' 3
Most of these new developments in the field of landlord-tenant re-
lations are occurring in the metropolitan centers where the proliferation
of slums and massive low-income housing developments have man-
dated them. Perhaps adoption of these new concepts in jurisdictions
which are not yet faced with these congestive housing problems would
serve to lighten the impact of these problems or even to prevent the
formation of these blighted areas.
Charles R. Hogshead
TORT-VIABILITY Is NOT A PREREQUISITE IN ACTION FOR INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY FETUS. Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758 (Ala.1973).
The Alabama Supreme Court recently ruled in Wolfe v. IsbelP
that a fetus which was negligently injured before it became viable and
10. See Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Academy Spires Inc. v. Brown, 111 NJ. Super. 477, 258 A.2d 556 (1970);
Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. Sylvania, Ohio 1972); Hinson v. Delis,
26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
11. See Income Properties Investment Corporation v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493,
284 P. 782 (1930); Darnall v. Day, 240 Iowa 665, 37 N.W.2d 277 (1949); Hinson
v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
12. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.
2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17
(1973).
13. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
1. 291 Ala. -, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973).
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which was subsequently born alive could maintain a cause of action
under Alabama's wrongful death statute.2 By allowing this action
Alabama follows a slight majority of states which have abandoned the
requirement of viability in allowing a wrongful death action for the
tortious injury to an unborn child." Wolfe is significant not only be-
cause it establishes in Alabama and affirms the modern view that via-
bility is no longer a question in allowing recovery for a tortious injury
to an unborn fetus, but more immediately because it illustrates the
continued drift into inconsistency and confusion which the law has
followed in regard to the rights of unborn infants.
Under the common law no action was allowed by the infant to
recover for prenatal injuries. When various jurisdictions enacted
wrongful death statutes and modern medicine established the separate
existence of the fetus, the law was forced to recognize a cause of ac-
tion by the infant. The courts interpreted the pertinent statute to in-
clude or exclude an unborn infant as a person. Viability and live birth
became focal points in allowing an action. The limitations apparently
developed from the need to prove that the fetus would have survived
but for the tortious injury.
As some courts admitted the inconsistency of refusing an action
by a nonviable fetus when medical science had discovered that the fetus
was a separate person shortly after conception, an action was permitted
by a fetus born alive whether it was viable or nonviable at the time of
injury. This is the status of the law decided in Wolfe.
Finally, several jurisdictions rejected the requirement of live birth
but required viability at the time of injury. The rationale here is simply
that the fetus could live outside the womb. Viability is synonymous
with birth; therefore, being stillborn after viability is the same as death
resulting from injury after birth.
Though the law of tort regarding infants is confusing and incon-
sistent the problem is further compounded when viewed in relation
to infant rights under property and criminal law and abortion.
While Oklahoma has not ruled on the issue of an injured fetus
born alive,4 it has previously rejected standing of a stillborn, nonviable
2. AI.A. CODE, tit. 7, § 119 (1960).
3. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.L 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div.
542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,
164 A.2d 93 (1960). For complete list see Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758, 763
(1973).
4. Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
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fetus. Wolfe is important because of the impact it will have on juris-
dictions such as Oklahoma which eventually will be confronted with
the issue of the nonviable fetus born alive. In that event these juris-
dictions will have an opportunity to reconcile the contradictions or
further develop the conflict. They must deny recovery because of the
nonviability; allow recovery because of the live birth; or follow the
logic of medical knowledge and permit recovery because the child was
a person when conceived, regardless whether it was viable or not at the
time of injury or whether it was subsequently born alive.
In Wolfe the father as the personal representative of the deceased
child initiated the wrongful death action against the defendant for
negligently operating a truck which collided with an automobile in
which plaintiff's pregnant wife was seated. The unborn child allegedly
suffered the prenatal injuries on March 10, 1970. More than three
months later on June 16, 1970, the child was born alive and expired
after approximately fifty minutes. The father claimed that the
negligence was the proximate cause of the infant's death.
In its ruling the Alabama court expanded the view it had es-
tablished in Huskey v. Smith7 where it held that a fetus was not a part
of the mother. In that case the fetus was viable and born alive. Huskey
had overruled Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.' which
represented the traditional view that the "unborn child was a part" of the
mother and only became a person when it was born.9 Since there
was no action at common law for injuries to the fetus inflicted before
the child's birth, the child itself had no protection for tortious injury.
An action for negligent injury was allowed to the mother, who could
recover for any damage suffered by the child because it was a part of
her.' 0  Stanford was consistent with the Restatement of Torts" and
the old rule established in Dietrich v. Northampton.12  The Dietrich
court found that an unborn child was not a person under Massachusetts
law and had no cause of action when it was prematurely born and lived
for fifteen minutes. The mother had fallen on a defective highway
5. Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
6. 280 So. 2d at 759.
7. 289 Ala. 53, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972).
8. 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
9. Id. at 611, 108 So. at 566.
10. Id.
11. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, § 869 (1938). It held that "a person who negligently
causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm.'
12. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). Contra, Keyes v. Construction Ser-
vice, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
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which caused the premature birth. Justice Holmes concluded that "as
the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury,
any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all
was recoverable by her . . . ."I' While the child in Dietrich was non-
viable at the time of injury, viability was not an issue under such an
encompassing rule.
The Huskey court did not concentrate solely on the question of
viability but relied on the basis of current medical knowledge to find
that a "causal connection between the prenatal injury and death is not
considered speculative"' 4 and to say that "a child before birth is a part
of the mother is no longer correct medical fact.""' Huskey found that
medical technology provided the impetus in removing many of the legal
problems which had prevented prenatal action. A child is in existence
from the moment of conception and is not a part of the mother's body.'6
Where the old rule held that a defendant owed no duty to an unborn
fetus, Prosser states that writers today find an unborn child to be as
much of a person as is the mother.' 7  Wolfe reflects this change of
thought which was first given judicial sanction in the case of Bonbrest
v. Kotz.m ' s In Bonbrest the child was viable and born alive. The court
reasoned that if the child could live outside the womb it was viable and
no longer a part of the mother. It was a person and could maintain
the action. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which followed
the reasoning of Justice Holmes in Dietrich have since overruled or con-
fined their previous decision to the facts. Only Nebraska, in Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co.,'9 and Tennessee, in Hogan v. McDaniel,2 ° have not
officially abandoned the theory that a fetus is a part of the mother.
As late as 1953, Oklahoma, in the case of Howell v. Rushing,2'
followed the reasoning of Drabbels and denied an action to a stillborn
fetus. Since no common law right of action for wrongful death exists
the "right of action commonly known as wrongful death accrues to
the personal representative of decedent solely by virtue of statute." 22
Although Oklahoma's wrongful death statute allows an action to be
13. 138 Mass. at 17, 52 Am. Rep. at 242.
14. 289 Ala. at 56, 265 So. 2d at 598.
15. HERZOG, MEDICAiL JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 860-975 (1931).
16. MALLOY, LEGAL ANATOmy AND SURGERY, 716 (2d ed. 1955).
17. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS, 336 (4th ed. 1971).
18. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
19. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
20. 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
21. 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
22. Haws v. Luethje, 503 P.2d 871 (Okla. 1972).
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brought by the personal representative of the deceased if the latter
might have maintained an action for injuries had he lived, the Howell
ruling excluded the unborn child from the purview of this statute.213
In Padillow v. Elrod24 the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized
that Drabbels was no longer controlling but followed the ruling of Howell
in refusing an action by a child born dead. In both Howell and Elrod
the court discussed the status of the unborn fetus and took notice of the
viability question, but in both cases the child was stillborn which was
the controlling factor. The court indicated that if it were faced with
the question of a child born alive which subsequently died of injuries
caused by the negligent activity of the defendant the deceased would
have a cause of action under Oklahoma's statute. The Elrod court
through dicta recognized the judicial trend not only in allowing re-
covery for prenatal injuries but also in excluding viability as a con-
trolling element. However, the court specifically stated that before a
stillborn child would have an action in Oklahoma the legislature must
change the law. The court rejected the reasoning of Verkennes v.
Corniea25 where Minnesota allowed an action by the next of kin for
the death of a stillborn child which was viable at the time of injury. The
Elrod view is consistent with that of the American Law Institute which
has discarded the criterion of viability and rested the cause of action
on the specific requirement of the live birth. 6 Only if the applicable
wrongful death statute provides for recovery does a stillborn child have
a cause of action.21  It seems that Oklahoma has accepted the reasoning
of Wolfe and rejected the requirement of viability but requires live birth
before an action can be brought under its statute.
A significant number of jurisdictions have gone further than Wolfe
and have accepted the reasoning of Verkennes v. Corniea in allowing
an action even though the fetus was stillborn.28  The Verkennes court
centered on the question of viability at the time of injury and abandoned
the requirement of live birth. The court concluded that "where inde-
pendent existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful
23. OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, §1053 (1971).
24. 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
25. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
26. RwSTATEmBNT (SECoND) oF ToRTs, § 869 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
27. 47 ALI ftocEDm S 371-377 (1970).
28. Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Rick v. Risk, 453 S.W.2d
732 (Ky. 1970); State to Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71
(1964); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Fowler v. Woodward, 244
S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 34
Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
19741
5
Brune: Tort--Viability is Not Prerequisite in Action for Injuries Sustai
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
act a cause of action arises .... 29 Where jurisdictions have al-
lowed an action for the stillborn child, the fetus has been viable. These
courts have based the action on the pertinent statute and found that
the legislature intended to include an unborn fetus in the definition
of a person. The fourth circuit in Todd v. Sandidge Construction Com-
pany" ruled that an unborn fetus is a person under the South Carolina
statute. However, where the fetus is not viable and born dead no ac-
tion results.8'
Though Wolfe is another case which has helped to lay the via-
bility question to rest, the rights of the fetus for negligent injury are
no more clearly defined and remain much in dispute. While the Su-
preme Court in Roe v. Wade rejected the argument that the fetus is
a person under the fourteenth amendment, most states had premised
the action in tort on finding the fetus is a person under its wrongful
death statute.82 Though the Wade decision centers on the question
of abortion it clearly illustrates some of the confusion and conflict that
surrounds the status of the unborn child. The Wade Court found that
viability was a controlling element for an action in tort. "In most states,
recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least
quick, when the injuries were sustained . . . ." The Court found
that "viability" was the "compelling' point at which the state acquired
an "important and legitimate interest in potential life ... ,,8' and
could therefore proscribe abortions.
While the status of the unborn child is determined by viability
when its interests conflict with the mother, Wolfe represents a grow-
ing trend to recognize the fetus as a person before viability when the
fetus is confronted by a tortfeasor. Where the unborn child is affected
by inheritance or property interests or criminal violations different
criteria are employed to establish standing for the fetus but in nearly
all cases live birth is required.85 The Wade Court found that recovery
for a stillborn fetus was often allowed to vindicate the interests of the
parents and that the stillborn fetus was not considered a person. The
Court did not elaborate on the question of viability in an action for tort
29. 229 Minn. at 368, 28 N.W.2d at 841.
30. 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964).
31. West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
32. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. at 163.
35. The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
NoTRE DAME LAwYER 349, 355 (1971).
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